Este blog es un instrumento informal de estudio y reflexión. Incluye también temática psicológica y de ciencias cognitivas en general. Normalmente varias de sus entradas estarán en construcción y la mayoría permanecerán abiertas (©Alfredo Martínez Sánchez)
Those who ignore philosophy are condemned to repeat it
Those who believe themselves to be exempt from philosphy influence are usually the slaves of some defunct philosopher
(Adaptación de Paul Thagard de las frases de Santayana y Keynes)
Those who believe themselves to be exempt from philosphy influence are usually the slaves of some defunct philosopher
(Adaptación de Paul Thagard de las frases de Santayana y Keynes)
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Philosophy of Psychology. Mostrar todas las entradas
Mostrando entradas con la etiqueta Philosophy of Psychology. Mostrar todas las entradas
domingo, 16 de octubre de 2011
"Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought". Fodor (1987)
Hay traducción castellana como apéndice de Psicosemántica en Tecnos.
"Mental simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse" Davies and Stone (2001)
DRAFT (to be proofread)
-Firstly, A GENERAL QUESTION: Why is (so) important the alternative between theory- theory and simulation? What is at stake?
One possible aspect of this question might be the idea of knowledge in theory-theory involving laws, generalizations, and/or formal rules. Simulation does not require knowledge in this sense.
It is clear the relevance of unconscious processes in our behaviour and even many psychologists point out how they underlie conscious mental states (and cause them, at least to some extent); the problem is whether to account for those unconscious processes in terms of (tacit) knowledge is justified. It is thought that human beings have a kind of innate unconscious system to produce language; due to this system we “know” how to use language, although we are no aware of the system itself. I think that this system is not “knowledge”, because there are different kinds of unconscious processes or unconscious mental phenomena and not all of them have to be knowledge. In my opinion, a key concept which I have not seen in these papers is memory: tacit knowledge should be something that you have stored in your memory and may be accessible. However, an innate and unconscious Universal Grammar (Chomsky) is not stored in the memory in this way. According to this criterion the ability to predict/interpret/explain the behaviour of other people could depend partly on tacit knowledge, but also on unconscious capacities not stored in memory (for example, mirror neurons and their operations). As a general rule, things that are innate are not stored in memory, but in other systems (or ways); therefore they is no (tacit) knowledge.
Possibly the notion of explicit representation somehow corresponds to the criterion based on memory, although they differ in some respects (interesting: analyzing these differences).
Explicit representation may be another controversial issue:
Does require tacit knowledge explicit representation?
The answer given by Heal is NO. But is more difficult to see why or how Davies and Stone connect this question to “the mirroning relation between causal structure and derivational structure” (it seems to me that this relation is, at least apparently, similar to the relation between syntax (causal) and semantic (inferential) in Fodor).
What does mean explicit representation? (An answer is provided in the article: language-like format, sentence-like representations).
PERSONAL AND SUBPERSONAL LEVELS
The final goal of the debate, as far as I know, concerns interpretations/predictions/explanations at the level of folk psychology[A1] . Since folk psychology runs at the personal level, this level turns out to be crucial. On the other hand, it may be uncontroversial that there are specific relations between personal and subpersonal levels (for example in so far as it is known that mental personal behaviour is connected to particular neural activity), the point is to figure out the nature of these relations and when they are relevant (autonomy, reduction, etc. –By the way, autonomy is relative, that is, concerns to a particular aspect or description, as there are actual relations-). Therefore, there are also subpersonal levels which can be considered if it is showed that they are relevant regarding the personal level. Several problems might be found in this respect: the distinction between biological (mainly neurobiological) subpersonal levels, physical - chemical levels, and psychological subpersonal levels (information processing mechanisms could be just a theory about these levels but I am not very familiar with this concept) is sometimes not taken into account.
QUESTION:
Although subpersonal levels are always unconscious, can be considered any unconscious mental state as a personal?
[A1]So, related to mindreading, to the theory of mind issue and to social cognition. But also to the computational theory of mind and AI (in Fodor explicitely).
"Beliefs and Subdoxactic States" Stich (1978)
DRAFT (to be proofread)
So far I thought that, according to functionalism, the key property of intentional mental states was, apart from intentionality itself, their causal role. However, in the Stich paper causality appears connected to subdoxactic states, while the relation between intentional states is mainly conceived in terms of inference[A1] . Moreover, Stich suggests certain link between inference and consciousness (what implies a link between intentional states, esenctialy beliefs, and consciousness), whereas in the standard cognitive-scientific view the link traditionally underlined has been between intentional states and unconscious processes (For instance, Fodor 1987).
Although the link between inference and beliefs is in general clear, sometimes the position of the author is rather confusing, for instance, he admits that “inference relation includes other states in addition to beliefs” (514). It is true that he assume the existence of “specialized and limited” (507) inferential contact between beliefs and subdoxactic states, but in other occasions he emphasizes the opposite view: the two features which distinguishes beliefs from subdoxactic states are the acces to consciousness and inferential integration.
Why is important the distinction between beliefs and sybdoxactic states? Apparently the reason, according to Stich, would be the acceptance of intuitive psychology theory (which is coherent with this distinction, unlike the theory posited by Harman). But it is a sufficient reason (or ever the only one)? (Stich also suggests the importance to identify a particular psychological state -500, also 514-515-).
In general, the article shows that the concept of inference is problematic and possibly ambiguous (see 512 and 513 –perceptual inference, computational inference, etc.). Stich claims that the use of the concept in this context is an empirical question (513-514), but a matter of definition, I think, rarely is just an empirical question.
Another interesting point is whether beliefs have to have the form of linguistic representation. In this were the case, then linguistic representation would be a criterion for beliefs (516-517).
Additional question: It is not very clear the relation between simulation and inference: the reason for neglecting the distinction, the author suggests, could be that “like Harman, many of those concerned with cognitive simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms underlying perception and thought that they have failed to note the rather special and largely isolated nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxactic states” (517).
ANOTHER QUESTION: THE NON-INFERENTIAL RELATIONS BETWEENS BELIEFS: How are interpreted in this context contradictory beliefs, inconsistency, etc.?
[A1]Could be worhty to note that Fodor posited a kind of nondemostrative inference: "the inference from like effects to like causes" (Fodor 1968, p. 627).
"Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States" Bechtel and Mundale (1999). "Neuroscience and multiple realizacíon: a reply to Bechtel and Mundale" Aizawa (2009). "Levels, individual variation, and massive multiple realization in neurobiology" Aizawa and Gillett (in Bickle, ed., 2009, 539-578)
jueves, 6 de octubre de 2011
Mental representation: An introduction. Jerry Fodor (1987)
DRAFT (to be proofread)
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS BELIEFS.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS BELIEFS.
When Fodor distinguishes two kinds of mental states he presents “propositional attitudes” defending the notion of unconscious mental states (1987, 106) and adds “For example, beliefs and desires, unlike itches and after images, can and often do lead an entirely dispositional existence; and what is entirely dispositional is presumably ipso facto not conscious” (107). While the primary feature of Qualitative mental states is awareness, the essential property of Intentional mental states, such as beliefs and desires, is aboutness (108), that is, they have intentional content. Cognitive science deal with the later kind of mental states (in fact, “from the cognitive scientist´s point of view, consciousness is an embarrassment, a pathological condition of the mental states that he studies” -106-).
CAUSAL AND INFERENTIAL RELATIONS.
“The intentional mental states seem to be closely implicated in the causation of behaviour; specifically, of intelligent, higher cognitive behaviour” (Fodor 1987, 108). Cognitive science shares with commonsense or folk psychology the idea that the behaviour of people is explained by their intentional mental states, basically because they play a causal role with respect to this behaviour.
Moreover, there are also causal relations among beliefs and desires (Fodor 1987, 123).
Fodor introduces inferences when considers the, perhaps, “hardest” question “that a theory of mind has to face” (123), namely “what is for a mental state to have
Intentional content” (ibid.). Fodor suggests that the answer can lies in the connection between the intentional content and the inferential role of a mental state. The examples of this inferential role are logical: “conjuntive belief is inferable from both of its conjunts while the discjuntive belief is inferable from either of its disjuncts” (124). This connection will turn out crucial in the Fodor view since it underlies his main aim: a theory which provide a bridge between causal role and intentional content. Such a bridge will be a sort of “parallelism” (124), due to the fact that inferential relations among symbols can be “mimicked” by their syntactic relations[A1] .
[Another question: It is consistent the statement that “Beliefs have their causal roles in virtue of their contents” (Fodor 1987, 111) with the claim that the causal power depend upon the syntax (see 125)?]
[A1]Thus, a semantic relation, such as deducibility (this is the inferential element), can be mimicked by a syntactic relation, such as derivability (see 125).
lunes, 3 de octubre de 2011
"True Believers: The Intentional Strategy". Daniel Dennett (en Lycan and Prinz 2008)
-Defensa (moderada -v. la distinción entre las dos afirmaciones empíricas-) del modelo computacional de la mente y del "language of thought".
-Me siguen pareciendo oscuras las nociones de "isomorfismo" y "reflejo" (mirror).
-Interesante revisar y analizar el concepto de representación.
-¿Qué aporta el ejemplo del termostato al debate?
-Acertadamente distingue entre dos afirmaciones empíricas:
-Me siguen pareciendo oscuras las nociones de "isomorfismo" y "reflejo" (mirror).
-Interesante revisar y analizar el concepto de representación.
-¿Qué aporta el ejemplo del termostato al debate?
-Acertadamente distingue entre dos afirmaciones empíricas:
sábado, 1 de octubre de 2011
“In Defense of Some `Cartesian` Assumptions Concerning the Brain and Its Operation”. Rick Grush (2003)
DRAFT (to be proofread)
Important point: to look for an alternative model to the computational theory (in other “machines”)
The author argues against two main theses related to the embodied cognition conception (and to other close approaches in cognitive science), claimed by who Crush called “the radicals” (Haugeland, Brooks, Clark, Van Gelder and Thelen, among others):
-The mind is not in the brain: cognition involves the interaction between brain, body and environment in such a way that the brain cannot be separate from this system [I will dub it “thesis BBE”].
-Cognition does not require representation [I will call it “thesis NR”].
The `Cartesian` assumptions will be the two opposite ideas: the mind have and manipulate representations [perhaps the claim here is too strong], and the mind is autonomous. But at the same time the author rejects standard cognitive science, in particular symbolic computationalism, so REPRESENTATION WITHOUR SYMBOLS (or without symbolic computation). But, what is the meaning of `representation` in this context? The answer is provided by the emulation theory: roughly speaking, the brain have two parallel functions, one as a controller and other as a emulator, the representations are embodied in the emulator
“The world is not enough” (86) (Cf. Brook)
Key argument against the view of representation in Gelder: p. 65
Brook: mechanisms interacts directly with the world, they don’ t need a kind of “in-between” construction (that is, representations) (see 68).
I am specially concern in the role of neuroscience in the enquiry on mind, and a significant feature of this article is the attention drawn [participio pasado comprobar] to real biological systems, particularly to the brain, along with some suggestions content about neuroscience (see 64).
The emulation framework is a kind of information processing strategy that in fact is implement in the nervous system: “The main idea is that musculoskeletal emulator can process efferent copies and provide predictions of what the peripheral signal will be before the real peripheral signal is available” (76). Evidence Gush mentions to support his claim is that certain movement errors have been explained (Wolpert, Ghahramani and Jordan, 1995) “on the assumption that during the initial phases of a movement, before proprioceptive feedback is available, the motor centers exploit feedback from an internal model of the musculo-skeletal system, while as time progresses, feedback from the periphery is incorporated into the estimate” (77). This internal model would be the emulator [related also to the simulation theory]
Another empirical evidence: Visual imagery (78) and visual perception (see Kosslyn)
PROBLEM: difference between on-line and off-line emulator operation
PROBLEM: How the argument about emulator and representation match with the argument about components
QUESTION: the argument based on the plug criterion and the pilot example (80) is enough to conclude that “the brain is a notionally self-contained locus of representational efficacy, not something that is essencially dependent upon the environment with which it is interacting…” (81). How the fact that the brain contains both the controller and the emulator is crucial for the brain to be a self-contained system?
The key point, I think, is that the emulator can operates without interaction with the real world
The argument rests on the emulation framework (74), in which is based the emulation theory of representation “according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensoriomotor conterfactuals” (53).
The author agree whith the radicals on many points (see 55, 87-88):
-The emphasis in sensoriomotor control.
The Watt governor and the Timothy van Gelder interpretation
The Watt governor is a feedback controller. Many feedback controller work because they form a dynamical system. Crush calls the strong coupling thesis the claim that “brain and body/environment are coupled in the way that a controller and plant are coupled in a feedback control scheme” (59). (closed-loop control and mutual interaction). This lead to an “radical” idea called by the author “the strong coupling thesis” (59), according to which “the brain and body/environment are coupled in the way that a controller and plant are coupled in a feedback control scheme –they are in a state of mutual causal influence, and appropriate behaviors are an outcome of this interaction” (59). See “the dependence thesis”.
ONE PROBLEM: How identify and individualize (analyse) components? (67)
-Functions: Interface/component argument (Haugeland)
-Activities (Brook)
-Plug criterion (Gursh)
I find very interesting the idea that the brain could employ different strategies for different purposes, and from this perspective different models of the mind/body system may be right or reveals some aspect of its organization. In this sense the goal of the author would be to add the emulation framework to a set of tools consisting of theories such as classical symbol manipulation, connectionism, and dynamical system theory (88).
Finally, could be interesting to note the rhetorical or argumentative strategy followed by the author, namely, to accept some premises from those he is going to criticize leading to different conclusions: “…Showing how even on their own terms, there is a powerful model of sensorionotor function that underwrites the Cartesian assumptions” (55). Another example is that the concept of representation satisfices the conditions established by Haugeland in order to be a representation (see 83-84).
sábado, 24 de septiembre de 2011
Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. C. Wright and W. Bechtel
DRAFT (to be proofread)
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Volume 12: Philosophy of Psychology. 2006. Pp. 31-79.
A crucial element in psychological explanation is mechanism. Psychologists tend to explain psychological phenomena in terms of mechanisms, but what is a mechanism? This is a (substantive) philosophical issue, point out the autors.
They start with Descartes. In his view the natural world (including human body) was mechanical. He understood this concept according to the mechanisms developed in the 17th century, wich "producted their effects because of the shape, motion, and contact between their parts" (p. 32). The inmaterial mind was excluded from mechanistic explanation.
Although philosophers such as La Mettrie argued for extending the mechanistic view to the human mind, the anti-mechanistic attitude was predominat. The authors illustrate this [tendency] whih the controversy about localizationism at the beginning of the 19th century. They appears to relate the localizationsim proposed by Gall (phrenology) to mechanistic explanation as opposed to holistic interpretations (Flourens). Likewise they connect, "at root", associatinist psychology to the mechanistic tradition ("since it constures thinking as involving an assembling or associating of ideas", p. 36) , in this approach the brain would be a mechanism for making associations [but thas appears to point to the holistic conception!].
I do not see how the mechanical (or mechanistic?) explanation relate to the link between a type of mental process and the brain. Broca was localizationist while Wernicke was rather associationit. In the 20th century a very holistic and anti-localiztionist conception was initialy adopted, but from 19860s-1980s researchers embraced a localization perspective what [able they] lead to a substantial ("dramatic") progress in identifyng areas of specialization in the brain.
This historic overview is not very useful in my opinion, the substantial content begins when the authors address contemporary conceptions of mechanism (p. 44), whose main feature may be the idea of "composite hierarchical systems" (p. 45), and, specially, when they dicuss the mechanistic explanation, in terms of ontic explanation (Salmon 1984), as an alternative to the traditional deductive-nomological model (p. 47 ss.) (see the connection to laws). They provide a number of interesting examples of mechanistic explanations both theoretical and in particular sciences. Relevant aspects in these examples are the role of casual relations, and the emphasis in how the phenomenon (or the explanandum) is produced. To point out certain regularities is not enough to count as explanation (p. 48).
However, the authors are critical regarding the distintion ontic/epistemic (allegedly parallel to the distinction mechanistic/deductive-nomological), that they consider naive (p. 50). In this sentse they point out in particular the problem to take the ontic conception literally (ibid.).
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Volume 12: Philosophy of Psychology. 2006. Pp. 31-79.
A crucial element in psychological explanation is mechanism. Psychologists tend to explain psychological phenomena in terms of mechanisms, but what is a mechanism? This is a (substantive) philosophical issue, point out the autors.
They start with Descartes. In his view the natural world (including human body) was mechanical. He understood this concept according to the mechanisms developed in the 17th century, wich "producted their effects because of the shape, motion, and contact between their parts" (p. 32). The inmaterial mind was excluded from mechanistic explanation.
Although philosophers such as La Mettrie argued for extending the mechanistic view to the human mind, the anti-mechanistic attitude was predominat. The authors illustrate this [tendency] whih the controversy about localizationism at the beginning of the 19th century. They appears to relate the localizationsim proposed by Gall (phrenology) to mechanistic explanation as opposed to holistic interpretations (Flourens). Likewise they connect, "at root", associatinist psychology to the mechanistic tradition ("since it constures thinking as involving an assembling or associating of ideas", p. 36) , in this approach the brain would be a mechanism for making associations [but thas appears to point to the holistic conception!].
I do not see how the mechanical (or mechanistic?) explanation relate to the link between a type of mental process and the brain. Broca was localizationist while Wernicke was rather associationit. In the 20th century a very holistic and anti-localiztionist conception was initialy adopted, but from 19860s-1980s researchers embraced a localization perspective what [able they] lead to a substantial ("dramatic") progress in identifyng areas of specialization in the brain.
This historic overview is not very useful in my opinion, the substantial content begins when the authors address contemporary conceptions of mechanism (p. 44), whose main feature may be the idea of "composite hierarchical systems" (p. 45), and, specially, when they dicuss the mechanistic explanation, in terms of ontic explanation (Salmon 1984), as an alternative to the traditional deductive-nomological model (p. 47 ss.) (see the connection to laws). They provide a number of interesting examples of mechanistic explanations both theoretical and in particular sciences. Relevant aspects in these examples are the role of casual relations, and the emphasis in how the phenomenon (or the explanandum) is produced. To point out certain regularities is not enough to count as explanation (p. 48).
However, the authors are critical regarding the distintion ontic/epistemic (allegedly parallel to the distinction mechanistic/deductive-nomological), that they consider naive (p. 50). In this sentse they point out in particular the problem to take the ontic conception literally (ibid.).
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